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In a 1994 chapter titled “Intellectual Disability and the Heritage of  Modernity,”
historical geographer John Radford criticized the lack of  scholarly interest in in-
tellectual disability (ID).1 Linking the general disregard for ID as an area of  in-
quiry to the complicity of  academic expertise in the social and economic
oppression of  those who bear this label, Radford argued that “our culture has not
only marginalized people with an intellectual disability, it has also marginalized the
study of  intellectual disability as a phenomenon.”2
A survey of  the field shows that, well over twenty years later, this state-
ment unfortunately still bears true: many Canadian historians and other re-
searchers continue to neglect the subject of  ID. And this is despite media
coverage and grassroots history work that has exposed how people with an ID
continue to endure, resist, and survive extreme levels of  violence, degrading treat-
ment, segregation, unfair labour practices, and institutionalization. The stigma
and discrimination that surrounds ID, the ever-present issues of  poverty and
homelessness, high rates of  sexual and other forms of  violence, demand in-
creased attention to these disability communities—to lives that too often are
deemed “not worth living.”
This is why two recent works on ID by Irina Metzler and C.F. Goodey
come as such welcome contributions, offering what Radford terms “vital islands
of  hope and inspiration.”3 Metzler’s latest book, Fools and Idiots: Intellectual Disabil-
ity in the Middle Ages (2016), addresses ID through close and comparative readings
of  medieval legal, cultural, medical, theological, and other texts, while Goodey’s
work from the same year, Learning Disability and Inclusion Phobia: Past, Present, Future
(2016), focuses on the modern era. Written as a follow-up to his 2011 mono-
graph, A History of  Intelligence and “Intellectual Disability,” which explored 16th–18th
century Europe, Goodey’s new text builds upon this previous work, with some
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forays into medieval and ancient periods. Together, Goodey and Metzler cover
much ground throughout Western Europe and its history, seeking to fill some of
the gaping holes in the historical knowledge of  disability, and, in the course of
doing so, they show indeed that “disability is everywhere in history, once you
begin to look for it.”4
Despite the seemingly specific nature of  this historical sub-field, the
questions of  who exactly is being studied, and why, diverge in dramatic and politi-
cally and theoretically rich ways. This brief  review article compares various ap-
proaches that have been applied to the study of  ID, focusing on these recent
works by Goodey and Metzler. The discussion seeks to demonstrate the political
and ethical impact of  key methodological disagreements, beginning with a broad
overview of  certain issues related to histories of  disability, and ID in particular,
followed by a closer consideration of  these issues in relation to both these works.
As we will see, it is possible to trace two recognizable stances towards ID which
reflect much wider debates and complex histories in the disability movement and
enable the assessment of  the value of  historical research to contribute to ongoing
political projects. 
“Usable Parts”: Challenging Biomedical Narratives of  Deficiency 
As with many other academic fields that have roots in social struggle, disability
history is an act of  resistance; it is often about people and movements reclaiming
the right to represent themselves and their culture by authoring their own narra-
tive accounts. Grassroots communities of  remembering—such as the Huronia
Survivors Speakers Bureau in Ontario, which formed in recognition of  the abuses
that took place in Huronia and other sites of  confinement for disabled people—
provide a platform for survivor accounts that help validate experiential knowl-
edge. The violence committed against those who were confined in psychiatric
facilities, regional centres for people labelled with intellectual disabilities, and
other institutional settings remains largely hidden from the public and overlooked
in historical accounts. Worse, the assumptions around disability that once permit-
ted these atrocities continue to stream unrefracted through contemporary policy
and popular consciousness.
For many historians of  madness and disability, writing history can be a
direct means of  contesting biomedical regimes that have defined their existences
as “social problems,” reducing their bodies to objects of  medical gazes and policy
management efforts. Kudlick tells us that the political goals that underscore this
research have helped to distinguish disability history from the history of  medi-
cine,5 so much so that even when disability is conceptually present in histories of
medicine, it may be framed in a way that is not recognizable or useable to disabil-
ity activists. Her warning that medical and disability history are distinct and mutu-
ally exclusive fields reflects an important source of  tension among historians. 
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Writing from the other camp, Linker argues for more common ground,
and demonstrates that that there are, nevertheless, medical history scholars who
remain critical of  dominant tendencies within their field. As Linker acknowl-
edges, such medical historical accounts “frequently tend to back on the familiar
frame of  disease history.”6 Against such deficit-oriented models and dominant
biopolitical interests, historians of  madness and disability have asserted their own
knowledges and practices which disrupt relations built upon the control of  dis-
abled bodies by experts. As such, they aim to undermine this wielding of
biopower over disability. Yet, within a general context of  ableism and disability
exclusion, histories of  ID are particularly marginalized. This marginalization par-
allels legislative standards that continue to deny decision-making rights to many
labelled individuals (those deemed “legally incompetent” due to real or perceived
intellectual impairments), forcing them to be represented by others and, thereby,
creating more barriers to self-representation.
The question of  capacity for self-representation brings us to the crux of
the difficulty of  historically conceptualizing and researching ID: by contesting ca-
pacity assessments, we are challenging the very medical definition of  the ID com-
munity, which has been characterized by low “IQ” and an allegedly radical state
of  dependency. Framed as the antithesis to liberal humanist standards of  citizen-
ship (as independent, atomized, and self-sufficient), people with ID have been ab-
horred, punished, and condemned to the status of  “absent” citizens.7 For these
reasons, historicizing intelligence is central to the political work of  combatting
ableism and reframing intellectual disability in more empowering terms. This
work has been underway for some time by groups like People First of
Canada/Personnes d’abord, but it has taken longer to catch on among re-
searchers. From an academic as well as a practical perspective, unsettling static
notions of  impairment and ID involves placing the medical gaze in its socio-cul-
tural context to reveal power dynamics that shape changing notions and standards
of  intelligence. 
While Metzler and Goodey both employ predominantly Western Euro-
pean source material of  impressive historical breadth and depth, their points of
departure echo deep divisions in disability studies and activism that converge
around and draw upon competing notions of  embodiment and justice. Here, de-
bates surrounding the material reality of  impairment and its social origins must
be recognized as fiercely contested terrain that shapes advocacy efforts in differ-
ent and sometimes irreconcilable ways. While many of  those involved in these
conversations do acknowledge interactions between material and discursive sys-
tems and practices, others continue to view the two as mutually exclusive. Neither
Metzler nor Goodey appear to subscribe to these dichotomies, yet the extent to
which each author draws upon theories of  ID as an embodied form of  difference
places their works in tension. As we will see, Goodey de-emphasizes the question
of  “real” intellectual impairments, while Metzler sets her premise upon the as-
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sumption of  this form of  difference, challenging its fixity only in the subtlest of
ways.
Measures and Markers: The Modern Origins of  Intellectual Disability
Throughout A History of  Intelligence (2011), and his most recent book, Learning
Disability and Inclusion Phobia (2016), Goodey unwaveringly challenges the possibil-
ity of  ID as a transhistorical condition that can be identified across time and cul-
ture. Underlying the historically contingent nature of  ID are complex interactions
between elite forms of  self-representation and dominant forms of  species-repre-
sentation.8 By emphasizing the modern and expert-driven nature of  these inven-
tions, Goodey shows how taken-for-granted labels, or “unstable categories,” have
come to define people with ID as a radical out-group.9 The emphasis here is on
the question of  “who decides who has an intellectual impairment.” People First
of  Canada/Personnes d’abord du Canada, the leading Canadian self-advocacy or-
ganization for people with ID, shares this concern with power differentials that
unfold through labelling processes, and there is much in Goodey’s work that can
help strengthen advocacy efforts by people who are labelled with ID. Importantly,
Goodey recognizes the presence of  labelling in earlier historical periods. Thus, his
strategy for debunking fixed notions of  ID is not to deny that intelligence-based
evaluations can be found in different historical contexts. Instead, he emphasizes
the different ways in which intelligence has been conceptualized and the uniquely
modern positioning of  intelligence as the “core definition of  the human
species.”10
Iterations of  this thesis appear over and over throughout Goodey’s writ-
ing. For instance, he shows that prior to modern Enlightenment thinking and the
rise of  capitalism, ID did not exist as a distinct and pathologized category. His
work from 2011 and 2016 draws upon ancient Greek philosophy and traces ideas
around intelligence through a range of  Western European historical periods, pin-
pointing the absence of  ID and related concepts of  intelligence, as well as their
appearance and articulation in eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought.
Goodey deftly demonstrates that while intelligence has certainly been central to
countless philosophical conversations at different points in time, different ap-
proaches to intelligence have also made it impossible to fully conceptualize and
position ID as a marker of  sub-human status. As we will see, Metzler completely
rejects this idea, insisting that ID is far from unique to the modern period and is
instead a category common throughout much of  Western history. Her disagree-
ment with Goodey turns upon their respective understanding of  how impairment
and disability interact with broader social structures as embodied forms of  differ-
ence.
To fully appreciate Goodey’s periodization of  ID as a modern occur-
rence, we should consider political and economic systems that have shaped mate-
Review Essay 111
rial and cultural conditions and, along with these, the position of  disability in so-
ciety. It is also helpful to recall how integral anti-capitalist critiques of  normalcy
and medical pathology are to projects of  disability recognition. For instance, it is
not uncommon to find claims that, prior to capitalist industrial development, dis-
abled people did not experience socio-economic oppression or pronounced
forms of  marginalization based on fixed views of  their identity—or at least not
to extent that they do today.11 Along these lines, Goodey explains that intelli-
gence, as it has come to be represented in modern Western thought, did not exist
until the last three centuries.12 Its emergence during that time was bound up with
classical liberalism’s doctrine of  self-government and its related obsession with
reason. 
Crucial here for Goodey is the way in which intelligence—the inverse of
ID—functions as the defining characteristic of  the human species. In his words,
“it is collective self-image and self-esteem alone that constitute what is currently
called intelligence—and therefore intellectual disability.”13 In this way, perceived
deficiencies in intelligence render one impure, animalistic, and unfit for species-
membership.14 Reading ID through Marxist notions of  commodification and
alienation, Goodey locates within this out-group the symbolic weight of  alienat-
ing social and economic transformations that affect in-group members, arguing
that “learning disability [ID] and learning disabled people are thus projections of
its [the in-group’s] own alienation and suffering.”15
Importantly, however, Goodey does not view ID as “a mere social con-
struction,” as he recognizes that there is an embodied dimension to certain dis-
ability experiences. Instead, his emphasis is on the relational and historical quality
of  the concept and the changing importance placed on intelligence as a marker of
sub-human status. At the same time, he explores the shortcomings of  certain
constructivist models of  disability and challenges relativist approaches that leave
intact a stable impairment reality. According to this reading, the social experience
of  disablement interacts with physical impairment(s), while “the thing itself, the
impairment, retains a more or less hidden reality.”16 Goodey tells us that while
this version of  the social model of  disability may serve the interests of  certain
disabled people, it is simply not conducive for understanding the history of  ID.
From his framing of  ID we know that ID-related impairments have a “radically
historical character,”17 and that these require a renewed emphasis on the social
quality of  impairment. Questioning whether ID is even always linked to impair-
ment, he is also careful to avoid any denial of  disability as material difference.
Goodey explains, “of  course, learning disability sometimes has some connection
to the materialities of  physical impairment, inasmuch as the brain may be differ-
ent.”18 However, he adds that this is not the point and instead directs the reader’s
attention towards the relational quality of  ID as it exists between the material na-
ture of  the brain as organ and conceptions of  intellect as an abstract quality, stat-
ing that “an additional explanatory link is needed, between the (impaired) material
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substance of  the brain and the (impaired?) immaterial intellect.”19
No Golden Age: The Historical Continuity of  Exclusion
The absence of  any straightforward continuity in the social meaning of  intelli-
gence and ID as disability and/or impairment, to Goodey, makes transhistorical
notions of  ID identity nearly impossible. This is more than a methodological
warning against presentism, as Goodey goes on to identify issues with projecting
current assumptions about ID onto the past: “When we assume that in the dis-
tant past intelligence and its disabilities, under any label, existed in a sense we
might understand them today, we turn a history that is rich and strange into a
recital of  our own prejudices.”20 Even though Goodey is careful to avoid “disabil-
ity denial,”21 one potential drawback of  his formulation of  the ID experience can
be found in the fear, shared by many Mad and disabled people, of  historical era-
sure—an erasure that is tantamount to reducing these groups to social construc-
tions. 
Metzler takes up this concern around the material reality of  ID in Fools
and Idiots: Intellectual Disability in the Middle Ages. Using a wide-range of  medieval
sources across different genres and disciplines, she demonstrates how ID has
been conceptualized through the often-interrelated areas of  law, theology, and
popular culture, to name but a few examples. Yet, as noted above, her conclusions
are strikingly different from Goodey’s. For example, she parses catch-all terms
such as “idiocy” and finds that they did give rise to/carry specific applications
that denoted “permanent” or “congenital” disability, and specifically ID, and not
simply broader social experiences such as illiteracy. More significantly, Metzler
maintains that intelligence has always been valued as a marker of  species-mem-
bership. 
The material dimension of  the impairment-disability axis serves as Met-
zler’s clearest point of  entry, and it is one that allows her to posit a “congenital”
form of  ID. She weighs in on the question of  historical continuity in relation to
impairment/disability identity, rejecting Goodey’s thesis by affirming that people
with ID existed well before the modern era. She supports this claim through a de-
tailed exploration of  intelligence-related terminology, its meaning, and, in some
cases, applications in various contexts. These examples are intended to show that
ID, or “knowledge as a tool with which to dominate others,” has been around
since antiquity.22 In taking this track, Metzler goes so far as to accuse researchers
like Goodey of  “dreaming of  a kind of  golden age” where people with ID might
have attained a higher level of  social inclusion.23 Unfortunately, her argument
against these authors is underpinned by certain unexamined assumptions of  her
own which risk degrading people with ID. For example, in offering up statements
that defend the complexity of  medieval labour, Metzler contrasts these realities
with the implied “simplicity” of  people with ID to suggest that those disabled
people would not have gone unnoticed. Addressing the “golden age” perspective,
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she writes, “It demonstrates the assumption that less technological societies are
overall less mentally developed, and therefore individuals with mental deficiencies
within such a society would not be noticed.”24 Taken for granted here is the view
that people with ID are “less mentally developed” and, that by association with
this group, medieval patterns of  life and labour are devalued as “less developed.”  
At work in Metzler’s critique is an essentialist understanding of  differ-
ences between people with and without ID. To suggest that people with ID
would not have fit into any pre-modern environment due to an inherent inability
to “keep up” implies some objective criteria of  normalcy and normal human at-
tributes. This provides an odd point of  contrast to arguments that adopt the self-
perception of  these marginalized groups—narratives that often seek to support
advocacy efforts by putting historical knowledge in the service of  anti-essentialist
struggles. In this regard, a key value of  Goodey’s operation is to de-stigmatize ID
by pinpointing the social interactions and mechanisms that shape and simultane-
ously degrade ID as a form of  social status. 
Despite these possible limitations, Metzler’s research into the medieval
period can provide a basis to help anchor certain cultural understandings of  peo-
ple with ID as an oppressed minority group with a far-reaching history. The im-
plication of  her main point—that people with ID existed in the premodern
past—is that disability oppression existed during this purported golden age. By
showing that people with ID did not fare any better in the distant past,25 she
helps document forms of  medieval exclusion, including the use of  specialized in-
stitutions for people with ID,26 and other efforts at segregation. Yet, the value of
this evidence risks being overshadowed by Metzler’s failure to engage with con-
temporary questions of  identity. Her relative glossing over current injustices—at
one point, she states, “I cite this to remind the reader how far, thankfully, we have
moved on since then”27—makes it difficult to understand how, if  at all, she posi-
tions her work in relation to ongoing struggles even as she points to possible an-
tecedents of  these structures of  oppression in the pre-modern era. 
Conclusion: Towards an Emancipatory Disability History
Metzler’s work may be read as being grounded in a curiosity for “what really hap-
pened” and the scholarly pursuit of  this purpose, and while this search can pro-
duce a lengthy inventory of  knowledge about possible attitudes, offenses, and
forms of  resistance, its value is somewhat constrained when it is not used to di-
rectly challenge or at least illuminate contemporary issues. Such historical inven-
tories and glossaries, which are entrenched in socio-political disinterest, may
mean little for some advocates of  change, looking to show other possible futures.
But this is not to say that other, future researchers and activists cannot make use
of  her work and draw explicit connections to current battles waged by countless
Mad and disabled people and their organizations. The distinction between med-
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ical and disability history is a contentious one that is not necessarily shared by all
practitioners.  
Nonetheless, historians of  madness and disability subscribing to
Kudlick’s approach may designate Metzler’s account as a detached history that is
missing a sense of  political commitment to anything other than disproving the
slipshod historical research of  others. As Kudlick reminds us, it is a commitment
to real-world value, balanced with historical theory, that helps distinguish disabil-
ity histories from histories of  medicine. Describing the important difference be-
tween medico-historical formulations of  disabled people’s lives and disability
history, Kudlick writes, “the crux of  the difference lies in policies, how explicitly
political one thinks this study of  history should be.”28 Recentring the hitherto
marginalized histories on those who have been affected by these constructions,
however, has the effect of  recovering these experiences out from under the struc-
tures that have historically kept them hidden and out of  sight.
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